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Abstract We examine a market in which a monopolistic firm supplies a good. The
production of the good causes damage to the environment. Consumers are heterogeneous
with respect to their disutility of the environmental damage. An environmental group can
enter the market and set up a campaign in order to influence consumers’ preferences. We cha-
racterize the equilibrium of the resulting entry-deterrence game and investigate its properties.
It turns out that the aggregated environmental damage is lowest if the firm is able to deter
entry of the environmental group and, moreover, the fixed entry cost of the environmental
group is small enough.
Keywords Environmental group · Environmental quality · Monopolist · Entry deterrence
JEL classification L1 · Q2
1 Introduction
Environmental groups (EGs) use campaigns in order to communicate with consumers.1 One
of the goals of such campaigns can be to discourage people from buying certain goods,
because the production process of these goods generates too much damage or pollution to
the environment. For example, it can happen that consumers are aware of the environmental
damage caused by the consumption of a certain good and dislike this detrimental effect. Yet,
1 For example, Greenpeace organizes campaigns about the environmental damage caused by different consu-
mer products, see under ‘campaigns’ at www.greenpeace.org.uk.
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a campaign launched by an EG could increase the level of guilt felt by them if they purchase
the good in question.
This paper investigates a model that can be used to study the effects of such a campaign
of an EG. In our model we consider a profit-maximizing monopolistic firm that supplies
a good on a market. The production of this good causes damage to the environment. The
monopolist can control the environmental damage generated per-unit of production by choo-
sing an appropriate production technique. However, the use of a cleaner technique also implies
that the per-unit cost of production becomes higher. Utility-maximizing consumers dislike
environmental damage, but they are heterogeneous in this respect (for empirical evidence
that consumers care about the environment, see e.g., Bjørner et al. 2004; Brockman et al.
1996; Teisl et al. 2002). The key feature of the model is that an EG can decide to enter the
market and expend effort in a campaign aimed at increasing each consumer’s disutility of
the environmental damage that results if he or she consumes the good. The ultimate goal of
the EG is to minimize the aggregated environmental damage (expressed in monetary value)
plus the costs of their campaign.
Our model is a three-stage game in which first the monopolist selects the level of
environmental damage per-unit of production, next the EG decides whether it will enter
and expend effort in a publicity campaign, and finally the monopolist chooses the price of its
product and the consumers decide whether to buy the good. We derive the (subgame-perfect
Nash) equilibrium of the model and discuss its properties. More particularly, we demonstrate
that the monopolist and EG are involved in a so-called entry-deterrence game (for a general
discussion of such games, see Tirole 1988, pp. 314–317). That is, in equilibrium we can have
a situation with either blockaded entry, or entry deterrence or entry accommodation between
the monopolist and EG. We characterize, in terms of the size of the fixed entry cost of the
EG, which of these three situations is relevant in equilibrium. Moreover, we compare the
size of the aggregated environmental damage across these situations. We show that aggre-
gated damage is highest if entry is blockaded. When entry is deterred, aggregated damage
obviously is lower than under blockaded entry. Under entry deterrence, the monopolist deli-
berately selects a production technique that is clean enough such that it is not profitable for
the EG to enter and start a campaign.2 Interestingly, for a range of small enough values of
the EG’s fixed entry cost, entry deterrence also yields lower aggregated damage than entry
accommodation. The mere threat of a campaign by the EG then disciplines the firm most
effectively to supply a relatively clean good. We remark that our analysis also provides a
rationale for why a government might want to subsidize EGs: by doing so, it can try to get
the entry cost of an EG in the relevant range.3
Our model is closely related to the vertical product differentiation duopoly model with
environmentally conscious consumers presented by Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) and
Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002). Further references that elaborate on the lat-
ter type of model are Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) and Cremer and Thisse (1999). We
remark here that these studies focus on the effectiveness of traditional tax and regulatory mea-
sures a government might use in order to reduce environmental damage. Non-governmental
organizations like an EG do not play any role in these studies. Instead, our study focuses
2 It is interesting to observe here that the electronics company Samsung announced in 2004 that it will replace
toxic chemicals (like brominated flame retardants) in some of its products by safer alternatives. This decision
was made after initial talks with Greenpeace (see www.greenpeace.org.uk). We can interpret Samsung’s
behavior as an attempt to deter a campaign by this EG.
3 We notice that in practice governments subsidize EGs. For example, the Dutch Ministry of Hou-
sing, Spatial Planning and the Environment provides such subsidies through the program SMOM, see
www.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=9813.
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precisely on the strategic effects between this type of organization and an industry. Doing so,
we limit attention to the most simple form of an industry, i.e., an industry with a monopolistic
firm. This is done for reasons of analytical tractability, and also enables us to ignore strategic
effects that might exist between firms in an industry.
We can make three further remarks concerning related literature. First, Liston-Heyes
(2001) also examines a model in which a monopolistic firm and an EG have conflicting
interests. However, different from our approach, in her model the firm needs permission
from the government for a project which, if approved, yields profit to the firm but damage to
the environment. The EG is opposed to the project. The decision by the government is binary:
either the firm is allowed to carry out its plan, or the permission is denied. The situation is
modelled as a rent-seeking contest in which both players lobby at the government in order
to increase the probability of a decision which is favourable from their own perspective.
Related to the approach in our model, Liston-Heyes assumes that the EG wants to minimize
the expected environmental damage costs plus lobbying expenditures. For a similar model,
see also Heyes (1997).
Second, Maxwell et al. (2000) discuss a three-stage model in which identical Cournot
oligopolists face the possibility of mandatory pollution abatement regulation by the govern-
ment. The firms first select a voluntary abatement level. Next, the consumers observe this
abatement level and determine whether to enter a so-called influence game. Finally, the firms
play a Cournot production game. If the consumers enter the influence game, then they as well
as the firms exert pressure on the government in order to induce it to prescribe a level of aba-
tement that is desirable from their own perspective, respectively, and in turn the mandatory
abatement policy is determined by the government. It turns out that, just like in our model,
in equilibrium there are circumstances such that the firms deter entry of the influence game
by selecting an appropriate (high-enough) voluntary abatement level. However, contrary to
Maxwell et al., governmental regulation does not play a role in our model.
Third, we observe that our analysis is related to the theoretical industrial organization
literature on advertising models. In this literature one usually makes a distinction between
so-called persuasive advertising, where a firm attempts to shift consumers’ preferences in
favour of its product (e.g., think of an advertisement that emphasizes that ‘you are cool when
you drink this beverage’), and informative advertising, where a firm provides consumers in-
formation about basic attributes of its product (e.g., about its price). Both types of advertising
are relevant in practice, and they are extensively studied in the theoretical (and empirical)
advertising literature; see Bagwell (2005), Carlton and Perloff (2005) and Tirole (1988).
Clearly, we can make a similar distinction with regard to campaigns of an EG: they can be
either persuasive or informative. In this paper we focus on the former type. We have a market
with consumers which are heterogeneous with respect to their environmental consciousness,
and the campaign of the EG is considered as ‘negative persuasive advertising’, i.e., it is
designed to shift each consumer’s taste by increasing the uneasiness felt if the consumer
consumes the damaging good (e.g., think of a campaign against the use of fur that shows pic-
tures of baby seals which are bloodily clubbed to death).4 For related studies in the standard
advertising literature on persuasive advertising in markets with heterogeneous consumers,
see e.g., Bloch and Manceau (1999), von der Fehr and Stevik (1998) and Tremblay and
Martins-Filho (2001).
4 Levitt and Dubner (2005, p. 152) discuss environmental risks in terms of an objective hazard and subjective
outrage felt by the public. They interpret activities of EG’s as ‘outrage increase’, hence negative persuasive
advertising in our terminology.
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Of course, besides persuasive campaigns of an EG, it is also interesting to investigate cam-
paigns which are informative. This might be relevant if for example we have situations with
asymmetric information, where the EG and firm have full information about the true damage
generated by the consumption of a good, whereas consumers do not have this information.
In a related paper, Heijnen (2007) investigates the effects of an informative campaign of an
EG in such a situation, using a model that is basically the same as used here. That study
takes into account that the EG has an incentive to exaggerate the amount of damage caused
by the good, whereas the firm has the opposite incentive (for a comprehensive account of
problems related to the transmission of information by special interest groups like EGs, see
Grossman and Helpman 2001). We remark here that the analysis in Heijnen (2007) is entirely
different than here, and boils down to an investigation of signalling equilibria, where the EG
and firm try to signal the environmental quality of the good by selecting an appropriate level
of, respectively, the costs of the campaign and the price of the good. For related studies in
the standard advertising literature, see e.g., Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) and Milgrom
and Roberts (1986).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2 we introduce the model. In Sect. 3 we derive
the equilibrium, and in Sect. 4 we examine some interesting implications of the equilibrium.
Section 5 concludes. Proofs and technical details are in two Appendices.
2 The model
Consider a market with a profit-maximizing monopolistic firm which supplies one good. The
production of each unit of the good generates a damage, d > 0 say, to the environment. The
actual size of d depends on the production technique chosen by the firm. Once this technique
has been chosen, the marginal (production) cost for the firm is constant and given by the
function c(d) > 0. We assume that c′(d) < 0 and c′′(d) > 0 for all d . If a good is produced
such that more environmental damage is caused, it also becomes cheaper to produce this
good, but this effect diminishes for larger d . The firm has no fixed cost.
Consumers buy either one unit of the good or do not buy it. They are uniformly distributed
on the line [0, θ¯ ] with mass one, where θ¯ > 0 is given. A consumer θ ∈ [0, θ¯ ] receives a
utility U = V − θd − p if he buys the good and zero otherwise. The good is only bought
if U ≥ 0. The term V > 0 denotes the intrinsic utility of the good, θd is the disutility
experienced by consumer θ as a consequence of the environmental damage generated by the
production of the good, and p is the price of the good. Note that consumers are heterogeneous
in the disutility they experience from environmental damage.
An EG has the option to enter this market, i.e., it can set up a campaign in which it exerts
effort to change consumers’ preferences by making consumers feel more uneasy with the
environmental damage caused by the good. Denoting the EG’s effort as x , we have x > 0
if the EG enters and x = 0 otherwise. We assume that as a result of a positive effort x , the
preference parameters shift from θ to θ + x for all θ , i.e., the disutility of environmental
damage rises with xd (see e.g., von der Fehr and Stevik 1998, p. 117, for a similar approach
in a standard advertising model). For the EG, it is costly to exert effort; the corresponding
cost function is given by s(x), with s(x) > 0, s′(x) > 0 and s′′(x) > 0 for all x > 0,
and s(0) = s′(0) = s′′(0) = 0. We call s(x) the publicity cost of the EG. The EG also has
to pay a sunk entry cost F ≥ 0, but only if x > 0. The entry cost can be viewed as the
nonrecoverable fixed cost of, for example, establishing contact with the media or recruiting
volunteers, i.e., all things necessary to set up a campaign. The EG tries to minimize its total
costs. If it enters, these costs are given by γ qd + s(x) + F , where q denotes the demand for
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the firm’s good, qd is the aggregated environmental damage caused by the market demand,
and the parameter γ > 0 converts environmental damage to its monetary value. If the EG
does not enter, its total costs are equal to γ qd .
We now consider a game with the following timing: in t = 1 the firm chooses d (by
selecting a corresponding production technique); in t = 2 the EG chooses whether to enter
or not. After entry the EG chooses x > 0, otherwise x = 0; in t = 3 the firm selects p and
next the consumers decide whether to buy the good or not. The timing of the game reflects
two concerns. For the firm it is relatively difficult to change its production process, but it is
easy to change the price. While the firm may change the price as a response to the campaign
of the EG, in the short run it is unlikely that it can change the production process.
In the next section we will derive the equilibrium of the game by using backward induction.
We assume that there always must be some consumers who are willing to purchase the firm’s
good, even if the EG has entered and exerted effort. Basically, this means that the EG is
not so influential that it can completely sweep away the firm’s demand. On the other hand,
we also assume that there are always some consumers who are not willing to buy the good.
In other words, the market is never covered, even if the EG does not enter. If the market
would be covered in that case, then it is likely that the market would remain covered for
small values of x , which would imply that then total demand remains constant. In this sense,
a covered market is a barrier to entry since the EG has to exert considerable effort to have a
minimal impact on demand. This would complicate our analysis without adding additional
insight. The assumption of an uncovered market is standard in the literature, see e.g., also
Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002).
Finally, if below a concrete functional form for c(d) or s(x) is needed, then we choose,
respectively, c(d) = α/d2 and s(x) = βx2, with α > 0 and β > 0. We notice that this
specification for c(d) is also used by Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002). It turns
out that we do not need these functional forms in the analysis of stages 2 and 3; however, we
do need them in our analysis of stage 1.
3 The equilibrium of the model
3.1 Stage 3
To begin with, suppose that the EG has entered and that x > 0 as well as d > 0 are given.
We want to solve for the corresponding optimal price in stage 3. Observe first that in this
case the consumers are located on the line [x, θ¯ + x]. The indifferent consumer is found by
solving U = 0 for θ , which gives θ = (V − p)/d . As a result, demand is given by














The first-order condition of profit-maximization reads
d
dp








384 P. Heijnen, L. Schoonbeek
which gives the optimal price
pe = V + c(d) − xd
2
, (4)
where the superscript ‘e’ denotes that we consider the case of entry. Notice that d2/dp2 =
−2/(θ¯d) < 0, which shows that pe indeed gives a maximum.
We easily obtain the following expressions for, respectively, the demand and profit in the
case of entry:
qe = V − c(d) − xd
2θ¯d
, (5)




We assume throughout the paper that, given x and d , demand is positive and the market
not covered. A necessary and sufficient condition for this to hold is:
Assumption 1 0 < V − c(d) − xd < 2θ¯d .
Notice that Assumption 1 also guarantees that the firm’s profit e is positive. Concluding
our discussion of the case of entry, we notice that, in fact, pe, qe and e are functions of x
and d . In order to simplify the notation, we do not mention this dependency explicitly.
Next, let us turn to the case where the EG has not entered (and thus x = 0), and suppose
that d > 0 is given. In order to find for this case with no entry the optimal price, and the
corresponding indifferent consumer, demand and profit, we can simply substitute x = 0 in
the results derived above for the case with entry. Using obvious notation, we then obtain
from, respectively, (4), (5) and (6) the following expressions:
pne = V + c(d)
2
, (7)
qne = V − c(d)
2θ¯d
, (8)




Observe that Assumption 1 is sufficient to guarantee that 0 < qne < 1. Also notice that pne,
qne and ne are functions of d . Again, we do not mention this dependency explicitly.
3.2 Stage 2
3.2.1 The decision of the EG
Turning to stage 2, suppose that d > 0 is given. The EG now has to choose between two
options: either it enters and chooses an effort level x > 0, or it does not enter (and then
x = 0). In making its decision, the EG takes into account the subsequent behaviour of the
firm and consumers in stage 3 as discussed above. First, suppose that the EG enters. The EG
then has to determine its optimal effort x by minimizing its total costs γ qed + s(x)+ F with
respect to x . This leads to the first-order condition
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which has a unique solution, xe > 0 say, given the assumptions we made with respect to the
function s(x). The second-order condition for a minimum is satisfied, since s′′(x) > 0 for
all x > 0. Clearly, xe is a function of d , i.e., in fact xe = xe(d). However, in order to save on
the notation, we simply write xe unless it is more convenient to do otherwise. We implicitly
also assume that V − c(d) − xed > 0, i.e., Assumption 1 must be satisfied. Remark that in
the case with s(x) = βx2, we have xe = γ d/(4βθ¯).
It is obvious that the EG will decide to enter if and only if
γ qed + s(xe) + F < γ qned, (11)
where qe follows from (5) by substituting x = xe. We can present the following result.
Proposition 1 Assume that d > 0 is given. Then there exists an Fˆ(d) > 0 such that for
0 ≤ F < Fˆ(d) the EG enters and exerts effort xe(d)which solves (10), whereas for F ≥ Fˆ(d)
the EG does not enter. Moreover, Fˆ(d) is increasing in d.
Proof See Appendix A.
Hence, the EG only enters if F is smaller than a unique and positive threshold Fˆ(d).
For the case with s(x) = βx2, we can find an explicit expression for Fˆ(d), by noting that
in this case




















Let us now consider the firm’s choice of d in stage 1, given the subsequent behaviour analysed
above for stages 2 and 3. In order to obtain tractable results, we use throughout the remainder
of the paper the functional forms c(d) = α/d2 and s(x) = βx2.
In stage 1, the firm has to choose d while facing possible entry of the EG. In fact, it turns
out that the following three things can happen: blockaded entry, entry deterrence and entry
accommodation. In the first two cases entry is barred, but for different reasons. If the firm
ignored the threat of entry, then it would set environmental damage such that its profit were
maximized given x = 0. In the case of blockaded entry it can simply ignore the EG without
further consequences. In the case of entry deterrence, however, the threat of entry is credible
and if the firm does not lower its level of environmental damage, the EG would enter. The
firm does lower environmental damage (because in this case it is profitable to do so) and
discourages the EG to enter. In the case of entry accommodation, the firm could possibly still
deter entry, but it is more profitable to let the EG enter and anticipate this entry.
It turns out that our model has a unique equilibrium. More particular, let us denote d∗(F)
as the equilibrium value of the environmental damage per-unit of production as a function
of F . Further, let dacc denote the optimal value of the environmental damage if the firm
accommodates, and dblock the optimal value of environmental damage in case of blockaded
entry. Using this notation, we obtain the following proposition.
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Proposition 2 There exist dacc, dblock , Fdeter and Fblock , with 0 < Fdeter < Fblock , such
that the following holds in the equilibrium:
(i) If 0 ≤ F < Fdeter , then the firm chooses d∗(F) = dacc, and the EG enters and behaves
as described in Proposition 1.
(ii) If Fdeter ≤ F < Fblock , then the firm chooses d∗(F) = dˆ(F) ≡
√
16βF θ¯2/γ 2 and
entry of the EG is deterred.
(iii) If F ≥ Fblock , then the firm chooses d∗(F) = dblock and entry of the EG is blockaded.
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 characterizes for each value of F , the corresponding unique equilibrium value
of the environmental damage per-unit of production chosen by the firm in stage 1, and the
subsequent entry decision of the EG in stage 2. Remark that for each case the subsequent
unique equilibrium choice of the EG’s effort in stage 2 and the firm’s unique equilibrium
price in stage 3 follow in a straightforward way.5
4 Properties of the equilibrium
In this section we discuss some interesting properties associated with the equilibrium of
Proposition 2. We first focus on the environmental damage per-unit of production, the market
demand for the product and the aggregated environmental damage. To begin with, we present
an immediate corollary of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 In the equilibrium the following holds for the environmental damage per-unit
of production:
(i) d∗(F) is a continuous function of F, except in the point Fdeter where it jumps down-
wards.
(ii) dacc < dblock .
(iii) If Fdeter ≤ F < Fblock , then d∗(F) is strictly increasing in F and d∗(F) < dblock .
Proof See Appendix A.
The interpretation of Corollary 1 is straightforward. Part (iii) shows that if F ∈
[Fdeter , Fblock), then the firm deters entry by lowering d relative to dblock . Parts (i) and
(iii) imply that there exists an F˜ ∈ (Fdeter , Fblock) such that d∗(F) < dacc if and only if
F ∈ [Fdeter , F˜). Thus, if F ∈ [Fdeter , F˜), then the firm deters entry by lowering d relative
to dacc. In the latter case, there is less environmental damage per-unit of production than
under entry by the EG. The Corollary is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Next, let q∗(F) represent the equilibrium market demand as a function of F . Then for
0 ≤ F < Fdeter , we have q∗(F) = qacc, where qacc is obtained by substituting d = dacc
and x = xe(dacc) in (5). For Fdeter ≤ F < Fblock , q∗(F) follows from substitution of
d = dˆ(F) in (8). For F ≥ Fblock , we have q∗(F) = qblock , where qblock is found by
substituting d = dblock in (8). We now can give the following result.
5 In Appendix B we present conditions (B.1), (B.2) and (B.4), which guarantee that Assumption 1 is satisfied
in, respectively, the case of blockaded entry, entry deterrence, and entry accommodation.
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d*(F)





Fig. 1 Equilibrium environmental damage per-unit of production d∗(F) as a function of F
Corollary 2 In the equilibrium the following holds for the demand of the firm:
(i) q∗(F) is a continuous function of F, except in the point Fdeter where it jumps upwards.
(ii) qacc < qblock .
(iii) If Fdeter ≤ F < Fblock , then q∗(F) is either strictly decreasing in F, or q∗(F) is first
strictly increasing in F and next strictly decreasing in F.
Proof See Appendix A.
According to part (i) of this corollary, if the situation switches from entry accommodation
to entry deterrence, then the demand for the product jumps upwards. This rise in demand
originates from the jump downwards in the environmental damage per-unit of production,
and the subsequent drop in the disutility of the environmental damage experienced by the
consumers. Part (iii) shows that if F increases from Fdeter to Fblock , then from some point
onwards the firm’s demand will decrease to the level qblock . Notice that the decrease in
the demand is caused by the fact that the increase in F is accompanied by an increase in
d∗(F) = dˆ(F), which enlarges for each consumer the disutility of the environmental damage
per-unit of production.
Proceeding, let D∗(F) = q∗(F)d∗(F) denote the equilibrium aggregated environmental
damage as a function of F . Obviously, for 0 ≤ F < Fdeter we have D∗(F) = qaccdacc;
for Fdeter ≤ F < Fblock we have D∗(F) = qˆ(F)dˆ(F); and for F ≥ Fblock we have
D∗(F) = qblockdblock . Using this notation, we can present the next proposition.
Proposition 3 In the equilibrium the following holds for the aggregated environmental
damage:
(i) D∗(F) is a continuous function of F except in the point F = Fdeter where it jumps
downwards.
(ii) qaccdacc < qblockdblock .
(iii) If Fdeter ≤ F < Fblock , then D∗(F) is strictly increasing in F.
(iv) If F < Fdeter or F ≥ Fblock , then D∗(F) is constant in F.
As a result, aggregated environmental damage reaches a minimum if F = Fdeter .
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Proof See Appendix A.
In part (i) of Corollary 1 we have seen that the environmental damage per-unit of production
jumps downwards in the point F = Fdeter , whereas part (i) of Corollary 2 learned that the
demand of the firm jumps upwards in this point. Interestingly, part (i) of Proposition 3 shows
that the former effect dominates the latter; i.e., if the situation switches from entry accom-
modation to entry deterrence, then the aggregated environmental damage jumps downwards.
Parts (i) and (iii) imply that the aggregated environmental damage reaches a minimum if
F = Fdeter . This, in turn, implies that in the case of entry deterrence there is an interval
with F small enough, on which aggregated environmental damage is lower than if the firm
accommodates. Note that D∗(F), qualitatively, is similar to d∗(F). Hence, a plot of D∗(F)
would look very much like the function plotted in Fig. 1.
Concluding this section, we make three remarks with regard to the total costs of the EG,
the firm’s profit, and the consumer surplus and social welfare in the equilibrium for different
values of F .




γ qaccdacc + s(xe(dacc)) + F if 0 ≤ F < Fdeter ,
γ q∗(F)d∗(F) if Fdeter ≤ F < Fblock,
γ qblockdblock if F ≥ Fblock .
(13)
It follows immediately that statements similar to parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition 3 also apply
to the EG’s total equilibrium costs: i.e., (a) ∗(F) is a continuous function of F except
in the point F = Fdeter where it jumps downwards; and (b) if Fdeter ≤ F < Fblock ,
then ∗(F) is strictly increasing in F . Using part (i) of Proposition 3 it also follows that
∗(0) > ∗(Fdeter ). Thus, the EG’s total costs are larger in the case of entry accommodation
(even with F = 0) than in the entry deterrence case with F = Fdeter . Finally, it can also be
shown (see Appendix A) that ∗(F) < ∗(Fblock) for all 0 ≤ F < Fdeter . In other words,
for the EG the total costs in the situation with blockaded entry are larger than in all possible
situations with entry accommodation.
Remark 2 Considering the equilibrium profit of the firm, let 0 ≤ F < Fdeter . For these
values of F , the firm accommodates entry and sets d∗(F) = dacc. The EG reacts by setting
x = xe(dacc) = γ dacc/(4βθ¯). The firm’s profit is the same for all F in the relevant region.
Next, let Fdeter ≤ F < Fblock . Then the firm deters entry by setting d∗(F) = dˆ(F), which
is an increasing function of F . Recall that dˆ(F) < dblock . Since dblock is the unique and
global maximum of ne, the firm’s profit must be an increasing function of F in this region
of F . Finally, take F ≥ Fblock . Then entry is blockaded, the firm sets d = dblock , and its
profit is constant for all F in this region. It is also easy to see that the equilibrium profit is a
continuous function for all F ≥ 0.
Remark 3 It seems tempting to examine the consumer surplus associated with the equilibrium
as well. However, a consistent comparison of the size of the consumer surplus for different
values of F is hindered by the fact that the utility function of each consumer depends on
x , which might take on different values depending on the size of F . In turn, this hinders
an analysis of the social welfare properties of the equilibrium as well. The problematic
nature of welfare analyses in models with endogenously shifting preferences is well-known
in the literature on persuasive advertising, see Dixit and Norman (1978). Dixit and Norman’s
approach is the following: compare welfare before and after the change of preferences using
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both the unchanged and the changed preferences for the consumer surplus. If both measures
point in the same direction, say upwards, then they argue that it is safe to say that advertising
indeed increases social welfare. Their approach is, however, somewhat controversial, see
Carlton and Perlof (2005, pp. 483–486). Simulations carried out by us suggests that, for
most parameter values, it does not matter if pre- or post-campaign preferences are used to
construct social welfare. In particular, it seems that social welfare is highest when entry
is deterred. There are, however, exceptions. For instance, if V = 1, α = 1/4, β = 1/4,
γ = 1/2 and θ¯ = 1, then under pre-campaign preferences social welfare is highest if
entry is accommodated, but under post-campaign preferences social welfare is highest if
entry is deterred.6 This impedes application of the methodology of Dixit and Norman, and
we conclude that further analysis of the social welfare properties of the equilibrium of our
model is not meaningful.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analysed a market on which a monopolistic firm supplies an environmentally
unfriendly good. The firm can influence the amount of damage generated per-unit of pro-
duction of the good by choosing an appropriate production technique. However, a cleaner
product also implies that the per-unit cost of production becomes higher. Consumers of the
good dislike the environmental damage caused by the good, but they are heterogeneous with
respect to the size of the associated disutility. The key feature of our analysis is that we
assume that an EG can enter the market and set up a campaign in order to increase each
consumer’s disutility of the environmental damage caused by the consumption of the good.
Thus, instead of analysing the effectiveness of traditional regulatory measures (like taxes on
dirty goods or unit-emission standards, etcetera) imposed by a government, we focus here on
the impact on the market outcome of the presence of a non-governmental organization like
an EG.
We have derived the characteristics of the equilibrium of the resulting entry-deterrence
game between the firm and the EG. It turned out that the aggregated environmental damage
is lowest if the firm is able to deter entry of the EG and, moreover, the EG’s fixed entry
cost F is small enough. Hence, the threat of entry (instead of the actual entry) by the EG is
most useful in this case. More technically, it appeared that aggregated environmental damage
reaches a minimum if F = Fdeter . Hence, our analysis suggests that it might be useful for
a government, which is interested in minimal aggregated environmental damage, to commit
itself prior to stage 1 of the game to the following policy measure towards an EG with entry
cost F : (a) if F > Fdeter , then the EG receives a subsidy equal to F − Fdeter in case
it actually sets up a campaign; (b) if F < Fdeter , then the EG has to pay a tax equal to
Fdeter − F in case it actually sets up a campaign. Observe that under this policy measure, in
equilibrium the monopolist actually always deters entry of the EG. Hence, in equilibrium the
government never has to pay a subsidy and never receives a tax, i.e., the measure is always
budget neutral. This is, of course, a very simplistic view of the way governments subsidize
EGs, but it does provide a rationale for these kind of subsidies.
We must emphasize that the current analysis still has a number of important caveats. We
mention here three. First, we study the case in which there is a monopolistic firm. In a market
with two firms the problem is changed in the following manner: if consumers want to buy
the good, then the influence of the EG is also to direct these people to the cleanest product.
6 The example satisfies the conditions associated with Assumption 1 as discussed in Appendix B.
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That is, while the monopolistic firm only “competes” with the option of not consuming, an
oligopolistic firm might also compete with the option that consumers buy another, cleaner,
product from another firm. Therefore, there is an additional benefit from producing a clean
good. If one firm decides to offer a cleaner product, then the other firms could well do the same
thing. By focusing on a monopolistic market, and thus ignoring the strategic incentives firms
have to supply a cleaner product than their rivals, it seems that, if anything, the effect of an EG
is underestimated. Yet, it is interesting to study these issues in more detail in future research.
Second, a specific formulation of the effect of the EG on the preferences of the consumers
is employed. In particular, we assume that the disutility parameter of environmental damage
per-unit of production increases with the same constant for all consumers. This implies that
the mean disutility of the consumers increases but the variance remains constant. Interesting
extensions would have the feature that the mean increases and, additionally, the variance will
also change. This would reflect the idea that high or low disutility consumers are more or less
susceptible to campaigning by EGs. We expect, however, that our main conclusion, i.e., the
structure of the situation resembles an entry-deterrence game, will not be affected. Finally,
advertising is modelled as being persuasive, i.e., the EG has the ability to shift preferences.
While this type of advertising is relevant in practice, it impedes welfare comparisons.
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Appendix A: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Remark first that if F = 0, then the EG will enter because we know that xe > 0. Next, notice
that xe does not depend on F . Therefore, the LHS of (11) grows linearly in F while the RHS
is constant. This implies the existence of Fˆ(d) > 0. Clearly, Fˆ(d) ≡ γ (qne −qe)d −s(xe) =


















which completes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2
We calculate the optimal d for the cases of blockaded entry, entry deterrence and entry
accommodation. In the case of blockaded entry, the firm maximizes ne with respect to d .
The first-order condition is
dne
dd
= 2[V − c(d)][−c
′(d)d] − [V − c(d)]2
4θ¯d2
= 0. (A.2)
Observe that this equation is satisfied if d is chosen such that V − c(d) = 0. However, such
a choice of d would result in zero profit and conflict with Assumption 1, and hence is not
relevant. As a result, we can reduce (A.2) to
V − c(d) + 2c′(d)d = 0, (A.3)
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Using (A.3), it can be shown that the second-order derivative of ne with respect to d
evaluated in d = dblock is negative if and only if 2c′′(d)d + c′(d) > 0 for d = dblock . The
latter inequality holds, since with c(d) = α/d2 we have for any d > 0 that







Hence, the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied in d = dblock .





Concluding, if F ≥ Fblock , then there is blockaded entry. That is, the EG’s entry cost is so
high that the firm can simply choose the profit-maximizing value dblock it would also choose
if the EG would not consider entry at all; in turn, given dblock , it is indeed optimal for the
EG to choose no entry.
Considering the case of entry deterrence, then the firm deliberately lowers the environ-
mental damage to a point where the EG does not enter. Recalling (12), remark that if both
F < Fˆ(dblock) and the firm ignored the possibility of entry and would set d = dblock , then
the EG would enter, i.e., entry is not blockaded. The firm could, however, try to lower the
environmental damage d such that F ≥ Fˆ(d), because in that case the EG has no reason
to enter. Since dblock is the global (and unique) maximum of the profit function ne(d),
this means that deviating from dblock lowers ne(d). In fact, the further d is from dblock , the
lower is the firm’s profit. This implies that the firm will lower d to the point where Fˆ(d) = F ,
making the EG just indifferent between entering and not entering. We denote this level of






Notice also that Fˆ(dˆ(F)) = F , and that for F < Fblock we have dˆ(F) < dblock . Of course,
this behavior should be profitable for the firm, i.e., accommodating entry should give a lower
profit. Whether this indeed is the case, depends on the magnitude of F . Before deriving the
exact range of values of F for which the firm will deter entry, it is convenient to consider
first the case of entry accommodation.




= 2d[V − c(d) − x
ed][−c′(d) − (γ d)/(2βθ¯)] − [V − c(d) − xed]2
4θ¯d2
= 0. (A.8)
This equation is satisfied if d is chosen such that V − c(d) − xed = 0. However, this choice
of d would result in zero profit and conflict with Assumption 1, and hence is not relevant.
Thus, we can reduce (A.8) to
5α
d2




which can be rewritten as a quadratic equation in d2. From this, one can verify that (A.9) has
a unique positive solution, which we denote as dacc > 0. After a straightforward calculation
123
392 P. Heijnen, L. Schoonbeek
it can be shown that the second-order derivative of e with respect to d evaluated in d = dacc
is negative if and only if
2c′′(d)d + c′(d) + 3γ d
2βθ¯
> 0 (A.10)
for d = dacc. Recalling (A.5), it follows directly that this is true, and we thus know that the
second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied in d = dacc. Remarking that dblock solves
5α/d2 = V , it follows from (A.9) that 5α/(dblock)2 < 5α/(dacc)2, and thus dacc < dblock .
Concluding, the firm chooses dacc if it accommodates to entry of the EG. Whether this
behaviour is indeed optimal for the firm, depends on the size of F .
Therefore, let us now analyse for which values of F either entry deterrence or entry
accommodation is optimal for the firm. We make a number of observations. First, using (6)
and (9), it follows that e(d) < ne(d), i.e., given d , the firm’s profit always decreases if
the EG enters (of course, assuming that Assumption 1 holds). Second, we define d0 > 0
according to ne(d0) = 0. Using (9), it follows that d0 = √α/V . Given d0 and using (12),
we next define F0 ≡ Fˆ(d0), and notice that F0 = αγ 2/(16βV θ¯2). Remark that if the firm
chooses d = d0, then it is able to deter entry of the EG for F ≥ F0, and in that case its
profit is just equal to zero. Third, observe that ne(d0) = 0 < e(dacc) < ne(dblock).
The last inequality follows since, while taking d = dblock , our first observation implies that
ne(d) evaluated in its global maximum must be larger than e(d) evaluated in any d .
Fourth, ne(d) is a continuous and strictly increasing function on the interval [d0, dblock].
Fifth, combining results, we see that there exists a unique, ddeter say, such that both d0 <
ddeter < dacc and ne(ddeter ) = e(dacc). Remark that the firm is indifferent between
choosing d = ddeter (in which case there is entry deterrence) and d = dacc (in which case
there is entry accommodation). Given ddeter and using (12), we define Fdeter ≡ Fˆ(ddeter ),
and notice that F0 < Fdeter < Fblock . Note also that d∗(Fdeter ) = ddeter . It follows that
for the firm, it is profitable to deter entry if Fdeter ≤ F < Fblock , whereas it is profitable to
accommodate entry if 0 ≤ F < Fdeter . unionsq
Proof of Corollary 1
Part (ii) is already discussed in the proof of Proposition 2. From that proof we also know that
d∗(Fdeter ) = ddeter < dacc. Part (i) follows directly. Part (iii) follows from (A.7) and (ii) of
Proposition 2. unionsq
Proof of Corollary 2
In order to prove part (i) we recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that ne(ddeter ) =
e(dacc). Using (5), (6), (8) and (9), we then obtain that qdeter = qacc√dacc/ddeter . Using
ddeter < dacc, we thus see that qacc < qdeter . Part (i) follows easily.
In order to prove part (ii), we first recall that 0 < dacc < dblock . Using (A.4), we thus
observe that we can write dacc = √kα/V , with k some real number satisfying 0 < k < 5.
Substituting this expression for dacc in (A.9), and rearranging terms, we obtain
γ
βθ¯




From this, we derive that
xe(dacc) = γ d
acc
4βθ¯
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Next, using (5) and (8), we observe that qacc < qblock is equivalent with
V − c(dacc)
dacc




Substituting dacc = √kα/V and (A.12) in (A.13), and multiplying the resulting expression
on both sides with
√











which after some straightforward manipulations can be rewritten as










which is satisfied for all 0 < k < 5. This establishes part (ii).









The second term on the RHS is positive, while the first term is positive if and only if
dˆ(F) <
√
3α/V , i.e. using (A.7), if and only if F < 3αγ 2/(16βθ¯2V ). We recall from
the proof of Proposition 2 that Fdeter ∈ (F0, Fblock), where F0 = αγ 2/(16βθ¯2V )
and Fblock = 5αγ 2/(16βθ¯2V ). We observe that Fdeter can be either smaller or lar-
ger than 3αγ 2/(16βθ¯2V ). For example, if α = 0.05, β = γ = θ¯ = V = 1, then
Fdeter = 0.0087 < 0.0094 = 3αγ 2/(16βθ¯2V ). But, if we take θ¯ = 2 keeping the other pa-
rameters the same, we have Fdeter = 0.0026 > 0.0023 = 3αγ 2/(16βθ¯2V ). (Both examples
satisfy the conditions associated with Assumption 1 as discussed in Appendix B.) Part (iii)
follows directly. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3
First recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that ne(ddeter ) = e(dacc). From this and (6)
and (9), we obtain





Recalling that ddeter < dacc, we thus have
[V − c(dacc) − xe(dacc)dacc] > [V − c(ddeter )]. (A.18)
Using (5) and (8), we can conclude that qaccdacc > qdeter ddeter . Part (i) follows easily.
In order to prove part (ii), observe that since e(dacc) = ne(ddeter ) < ne(dblock), we
have





Using dacc < dblock , (5) and (8), we obtain that qaccdacc < qblockdblock , i.e. part (ii).
In order to prove part (iii), let Fdeter ≤ F < Fblock . Using (8), we see that for such F
we have D∗(F) = q∗(F)d∗(F) = (V − c(dˆ(F)))/(2θ¯ ). We next observe that this D∗(F)












[−c′(dˆ(F))] > 0. (A.20)
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This completes the proof. 
Ad Remark 1
Take an arbitrary 0 ≤ F < Fdeter . We know that given such an F , in equilibrium we have
d = dacc, and moreover













where the first inequality follows since entry is profitable for the EG if d = dacc, the second
inequality uses (8), and the third one uses dacc < dblock . unionsq
Appendix B: details regarding assumption 1
In deriving the equilibrium of the game, we have acted so far as if Assumption 1
simultaneously holds for dblock (blockaded entry), dˆ(F) (entry deterrence) and dacc and
xe = xe(dacc) (entry accommodation). In this appendix we will show that there indeed exist
combinations of parameters of the model for which our approach is justified. We will examine
the three cases one by one. Again we use c(d) = α/d2 and s(x) = βx2, with α > 0 and
β > 0.
Blockaded entry It has to be shown that there exist parameters such that V − c(d) > 0
and V − c(d) < 2θ¯d for d = dblock . Substituting (A.4), it follows that the first inequality is





Entry deterrence We have to demonstrate that there exist parameters such that V −c(d) > 0
and V − c(d) < 2θ¯d for d = dˆ(F). Substituting (A.7), we see that the first inequality is





Next, taking arbitrary d > 0 and substituting c(d) = α/d2, we can rewrite V − c(d) < 2θ¯d
as
2θ¯d3 − V d2 + α > 0. (B.3)
Clearly, (B.3) is satisfied if d is close enough to zero and if d becomes infinitely large.
Furthermore, the LHS of (B.3) has a minimum at d = V/(3θ¯ ). Substitution shows that
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Clearly, (B.4) is sufficient to guarantee that V − c(d) < 2θ¯d for d = dˆ(F).
Accommodation We have to show that V − c(d) − xd > 0 and V − c(d) − xd < 2θ¯d
for d = dacc and x = xe = xe(dacc). Observe that dacc is defined as the solution of
−2c′(d)d = V − c(d) + 3xed , which can be rewritten as













Next, recall from (A.9) that dacc is the solution of
3γ
4βθ¯
d4 + V d2 − 5α = 0, (B.8)
which is a quadratic equation in d2. Solving this equation for d2, and picking out the positive
























Therefore, define A ≡ 2βθ¯V/(3γ ), B ≡ 20βθ¯/(3γ ) and C ≡ 4βθ¯/γ , where B > C .




(B − C)2 , (B.11)





Finally, we need to show that for d = dacc we have V − c(d) − xed < 2θ¯d , which,
using (B.5), is equivalent with −2c′(d)d < 2θ¯d +4xed . Using dblock > dacc, it follows that
c′(dacc) > c′(dblock) > −θ¯ . The latter inequality follows since dblock is defined by (A.3)
and, moreover, we know that V − c(dblock) < 2θ¯dblock . Using c′(dacc) > −θ¯ , we have
−2c′(dacc)dacc < 2θ¯dacc, and thus certainly −2c′(dacc)dacc < 2θ¯dacc + 4xedacc.
Conclusion There are four restrictions, namely (B.1), (B.2), (B.4) and (B.12). Two of these
are lower bounds on α and the other two are upper bounds on α. Remark that all restrictions
are satisfied if, for example, we take β or θ¯ large enough, or γ small enough. Hence, the
restrictions are not contradictory.
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